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NOTES
LOUISIANA'S FORBIDDEN ANTENUPTIAL WAIVER OF ALIMONY
PENDENTE LITE

Andrew Holliday and Vertie Eagles entered into an antenuptial agreement which included the wife's waiver of alimony
in the event of separation or divorce. Thirteen years after their
marriage Mrs. Holliday petitioned the court for a judicial separation and alimony pendente lite; she received a judgment of
separation and an award of alimony pendente lite of $400 per
month. The Third Circuit Court of Appeal reversed that part
of the judgment awarding alimony pendente lite, concluding
that her pre-marital waiver of alimony was binding.' The
Louisiana Supreme Court reversed, holding that a wife's antenuptial waiver of alimony pendente lite is null and void as
contrary to public policy. Holliday v. Holliday, 358 So. 2d 618
(La. 1978).
The Digest of 1808 contained a provision for alimony pendente lite which used language similar to that of the French
Projet du Gouvernement of 1800.2 This provision eventually
became article 148 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 18701 which
was given its present form by legislative amendment in 1928.1
Article 148 allows support to a wife from her husband, whether
she is plaintiff or defendant, if she has insufficient income for
her maintenance .pending suit for separation from bed and
board or divorce.5
Most judicial considerations of article 148 have viewed alimony pendente lite as a continuation of the husband's duty to
support his wife. In a few cases the court has merely spoken of
this duty owed by the husband, without mentioning specific
1.
2.

346 So. 2d 1382 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977), rev'd, 358 So. 2d 618 (La. 1978).
1972 COMPILED EDITION OF THE CIVIL CODES OF LOUISIANA art. 148 (J. Dainow
ed.). Compare LA. DIGEST OF 1800, bk. 1, tit. 5, art. 12 with PROJET DU GOUVERNEMENT
(1800), bk. 1, tit. 4, art. 34.
3. 1972 COMPILED EDITION OF THE CIVIL CODES OF LOUISIANA art. 148 (J. Dainow
ed.).
4. 1928 La. Acts, No. 130, amending LA. CIV. CODE art. 148.
5. LA. CIv. CODE art. 148 states:
If the wife has not a sufficient income for her maintenance pending the suit for
separation from bed and board or for divorce, the judge shall allow her, whether
she appears as plaintiff or defendant, a sum for her support, proportioned to her
needs and to the means of her husband.
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codal provisions.' In other instances the court has specifically
identified the husband's duty as that which arises under article
120.1 However, the husband's duty under article 120 is contingent upon his wife residing with him, which she is relieved of
doing when article 148 is applicable. The proposition that article 148 implements the duty of support under article 120 is
dubious in view of the fact that only the husband's duty of
support is enforced while the wife's reciprocal duty to live with
the husband is no longer imposed.'
It is perhaps because of this inconsistency that some courts
have sought other grounds on which to base the article 148
alimony requirement. In an early decision the Louisiana Supreme Court declared that the husband's role as head and
master of the community is the basis for alimony pendente
lite.' The court again took this approach in the more recent
case of Williams v. Williams. 0, The Williams decision took notice of the husband's role as head and master of the community," recognized the difficulties which the wife may en6. See, e.g., Grisamore v. Grisamore, 191 La. 770, 186 So. 98 (1939); Arnold v.
Arnold, 186 La. 323, 172 So. 172 (1937).
7. See, e.g., Ward v. Ward, 339 So. 2d 839 (La. 1976); Murphy v. Murphy, 229
La. 849, 87 So. 2d 4 (1956); Eals v. Swan, 221 La. 329, 59 So. 2d 409 (1952); Smith v.
Smith, 217 La. 646, 47 So. 2d 32 (1950); Cotton v. Wright, 193 La. 520, 190 So. 665
(1939); State ex rel. Huber v. King, 49 La. Ann. 1503, 22 So. 887 (1897).
LA. CIv. CODE art. 120 states: "The wife is bound to live with her husband and to
follow him wherever he chooses to reside; the husband is obliged to receive her and to
furnish her with whatever is required for the convenience of life, in proportion to his
means and condition."
8. See Lazarus, What PriceAlimony, 11 LA. L. REV. 401, 416 (1951). Article 119
of the Civil Code also establishes a duty of support. This article cannot be the basis
for article 148, however, since article 119 establishes a reciprocal duty of support,
placing the obligation upon both spouses. See Justice Calogero's dissent in Holliday
v. Holliday, 358 So. 2d at 622 (Calogero, J., dissenting).
9. LeBeau v. Trudeau, 1 Mart. (N.S.) 93 (La. 1823). The court stated: "Whether
separated from the husband or not, she has a right to subsistence, and until sentence
pronounced, it is the duty of the husband to furnish it. He is the head of the community, and its revenues are in'his hands for this purpose." Id. at 94.
10. 331 So. 2d 438 (La. 1976). In Williams the husband claimed that article 148,
granting the right to alimony pendente lite only to the wife, denied equal protection
of the law to married men. The Louisiana Supreme Court held article 148 to be
constitutional, on the ground that it bears a fair and substantial relation to a legitimate
legislative objective-a fair and orderly termination of the couple's community regime.
Id. at 441.
11. Id. at 440. See LA. Civ. CODE art. 2404 which states, inter alia: "The husband
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counter in obtaining access to the community funds when the
couple is living separate and apart,'" and concluded that the
purpose of article 148 is to provide a "fair and orderly termination of the community regime."' 3
Antenuptial agreements, such as the one in Holliday, are
regulated by the Louisiana Civil Code. Article 2325 authorizes
couples to enter into antenuptial agreements provided that
they are not contrary to good morals." Other articles contain
express prohibitions against certain types of provisions in premarital contracts.'5 Antenuptial agreements are also limited by
article 11, which is a general prohibition against any contracts
in derogation of laws made to protect public order or good
morals. 6
In Holliday v. Holliday'" the Louisiana Supreme Court
began its consideration of the alienability of alimony pendente
lite by examining the codal provision for antenuptial agreements, article 2325.'1 The court declared that the sole issue to
is the head and master of the partnership or community of gains; he administers its
effects, disposes of the revenues which they produce, and may alienate them by an
onerous title, without the consent and permission of his wife."
12. 331 So. 2d at 441.
13. Id. This same view has been expressed by Planiol, who observed: "It is always
the wife who is in need of alimony. Even when she has private means it often happens
that, according to the marriage contract, the husband has the administration and use
of her income." 1 M. PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE pt. 1, no. 1247 at 689 (11th ed. La.
St. L. Inst. trans. 1959).
14. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2325 states: "In relation to property, the law only regulates
the conjugal association, in default of particular agreements, which the parties are at
liberty to stipulate as they please, provided they be not contrary to good morals, and
under the modifications hereafter prescribed."
15. LA. Civ. CODE arts. 2326-27. These articles preclude the spouses from altering
the legal order of descents (article 2326), and from restricting the husband's rights as
head of the family (article 2327).
16. LA. CIv. CODE art. 11. Article 11 states:
Individuals can not by their conventions, derogate from the force of laws made
for the preservation of public order or good morals.
But in all cases in which it is not expressly or impliedly prohibited, they
can renounce what the law has established in their favor, when the renunciation
does not affect the rights of others, and is not contrary to the public good.
For an extensive consideration of this article's sources and application, see Broadwell
v. Rodrigues, 18 La. Ann. 68 (1866).
17. 358 So. 2d 618 (La. 1978).
18. Id. at 619. See note 14, supra, for the text of article 2325. In a footnote, the
court also referred to article 11. 358 So. 2d at 621-22 n.4.
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be decided was whether the antenuptial waiver of alimony was
contrary to public policy, and as such null and void."0
The court next turned its attention to the codal authority
for alimony pendente lite, article 148.0 In so doing, it examined
the husband's duties of support under articles 119 and .120 and
concluded that alimony pendente lite is a method of enforcing
the husband's duty of support under article 120.1 This basis,
the court concluded, has the effect of making the husband's
duty to pay alimony pendente lite an expression of public
2
policy by the state.1

Since the right to alimony pendente lite is a matter of
public policy, the court determined that any waiver of this
right would be against the public interest. This determination
was predicated upon a two-fold basis: "The policy involved is
that conditions which affect entitlement to alimony pendente
lite cannot be accurately foreseen at the time antenuptial
agreements are entered, and the public interest in enforcement
of the legal obligation to support overrides the premarital anticipatory waiver of alimony. 2' 3 The antenuptial waiver of ali-

mony pendente lite by the wife violated a rule of public policy
24
and was found to be an absolute nullity.
Two members of the court dissented from the Holliday
decision.2 5 Justice Calogero disagreed with the majority's designation of the right to alimony pendente lite as a provision of
good morals and public policy. 26 He contended that neither
article 119 nor article 120 is the basis for alimony under article
148.2 Instead, Justice Calogero chose to define the basis for
19. 358'So. 2d at 619.
20. Id. at 620,
21. Id. The court stated: "[Ain order to pay alimony pendente lite is merely an
enforcement of the obligation of the husband to support his wife as it exists under La.
Civil Code art. 120 .
Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 621 (Calogero, Summers, J.J., dissenting). Justice Calogero authored
the dissenting opinion.
26. Id. at 622.
27. Id. Justice Calogero contended that article 119 cannot form the basis for
alimony pendente lite since it provides a mutual duty of support, while article 148
extends alimony pendente lite only to the wife-a result that would be incongruous.
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article 148, as it had been articulated in Williams v. Williams,2

to be protection of the wife at a time when she has no access
to the assets of the community due to her estrangement from
her husband and his role as head and master."0 The dissenting
justices also disagreed with the public policy assertion by the
majority that alimony pendente lite is necessary to prevent the
wife from becoming a social burden, calling the conclusion "a
demeaning one which is inconsistent with the realities of the
day.

' 30

Finding no public interest in alimony pendente lite,

Justice Calogero viewed it as a right for the benefit of the
individual, which should be alienable by the wife in an ante3
nuptial contract. 1

The first factor which led the court in Holliday to declare
that alimony pendente lite is a non-waivable right is the lack
of foreseeability of conditions affecting the right to alimony
pendente lite. This contention of lack of foreseeability is not a
convincing reason for making alimony pendente lite nonwaivable. Foreseeability is not a requirement in other contractual situations, since it is specifically dispensed with by Louisiana Civil Code article 2982.32 The courts have recognized the
validity of contracts in other areas where foreseeability was not
present at the time the contract was made.i The Holliday
decision provides no reason why a different rule should apply
in the area of pre-marital agreements; therefore, lack of foreFurthermore, he maintained that neither was article 120 the basis for article 148, since
the husband's duty of support under that article is contingent upon the wife residing
with him, a condition obviously absent when the couple is living separate and apart.
Id.
28. 331 So. 2d 438 (La. 1976). For a discussion of the Williams case, see note 10,
supra.
29. 358 So. 2d at 622 (Calogero, J., dissenting).
30. Id.
31. Id. Justice Calogero also relied upon the legal principle of freedom of contract
in maintaining that the right to alimony pendente lite is alienable. See M. PLANIOL,
supra note 13, at no. 288.
32. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2982 states: "The aleatory contract is a mutual agreement,
of which the effects, with respect both to the advantages and losses, whether to all the
parties or to one or more of them, depend on an uncertain event."
33. See, e.g., Moore v. Johnston, 8 La. Ann. 488 (1852); Henderson v. Stone, 1
Mart. (N.S.) 639 (La. 1823); McDonald v. Grande Corp., 214 So. 2d 795 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1968); Gerde Newman & Co. v. Curcuru, 19 La. App. 154, 139 So. 83 (Orl. Cir.
1932).
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seeability should not operate as a bar to the ability to waive
alimony pendente lite in an antenuptial contract.3 4 Should the
court persist in recognizing this as a factor, however, recent
changes in the laws on matrimonial regimes"5 could have the
effect of removing foreseeability as a consideration in some
instances. In its 1978 session, the Louisiana legislature enacted
La. Revised Statutes 9:28346 which allows couples to contract
to establish, modify or terminate a matrimonial regime 3 at any
time before or during the marriage. This raises the possibility
that a couple could enter a contract during the marriage in
which the wife waives her right to alimony. In such an instance,
the Holliday court's concern with lack of foreseeability could
possibly be overcome with the result that any bar to the waiver
of alimony would have to rest on other grounds.
In Holliday the majority abandoned the basis for article
148 articulated in Williams v. Williams.3 The basis for alimony
pendente lite set forth in Williams, that is, the husband's role
as head and master of the community, cannot withstand careful consideration. As pointed out by the dissent in that case,
husbands have been required to pay alimony pendente lite
after the partition of the community, when the wife's earnings
did not fall into the community since the couple was living
separate and apart, while the wife's income from her separate
property had never entered the community, and even, as in
Holliday, when the couple remained separate in property and
there existed no community between. them. These results
34. Furthermore, recently passed matrimonial regimes legislation would subject
marriage contracts to specific matrimonial regimes provisions and "other Jaws." LA.
R.S. 9:2832 (Supp. 1978). These other laws would include article 2982, relating to
aleatory contracts. Id.
35. 1978 La. Acts, No. 627.
36. 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, § 1, adding LA. R.S. 9:2834. LA. R.S. 9:2834 (Supp.
1978) provides, inter alia: "A contract, whether establishing a matrimonial regime or
modifying or terminating an established regime, may be entered into at any time
before or during marriage."
37. LA. R.S. 9:2831 (Supp. 1978) defines matrimonial regimes as follows:
"Matrimonial regimes regulate the ownership and management of the assets and liabilities of married persons, and in relation to their property, their rights and obligations with respect to each other and to third persons."
38. 331 So. 2d 438 (La. 1976).
39. Id. at 442 (Calogero, J., dissenting).

1979]

NO TES

1167

would be inappropriate if the husband's duty to pay alimony
pendente lite is based upon the difficulty of the wife to obtain
community funds because he is the head and master. 0 In basing alimony pendente lite on the husband's duty of support
under article 120 the court in Holliday appears to have recognized the infirmities in the basis for article 148 set forth by the
Williams decision.
The rejection of the Williams basis by the Holliday decision necessarily raises the question of the constitutionality of
article 148 once more. However, a recent decision of the United
States Supreme Court, Orr v. Orr,4 has had the effect of deciding the issue raised in Williams, on federal constitutional
grounds. In Orr the Supreme Court declared that an Alabama
statute which provided alimony for the wife alone violates the
fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause. 2 The rationale of this decision applies as well to Louisiana's alimony pendente lite provision43 and virtually establishes its unconstitutionality. The most likely response for the Louisiana legislature
is to provide access to alimony for both spouses. Such a solution would maintain the question of the alienability of the right
to alimony pendente lite as an important issue.
The second and most significant ground for its decision
articulated by the majority in Holliday is the public interest in
enforcing the husband's duty of support." The decision fails to
detail the exact nature of this interest, however. Loyacano v.
Loyacano, 5 decided shortly before Holliday, is of assistance in
explaining what the court considered to be the public's interest
in enforcing the husband's duty of support." Loyacano, con40. See Lazarus, supra note 8, at 417.
41. 99 S. Ct. 1102 (1979).
42. Id. at 1113.
43. LA. Civ. CODE art. 148.
44. 358 So. 2d at 620.
45. 358 So. 2d 304 (La. 1978), vacated, 99 S. Ct. 1488 (1979).
46. Loyacano involved a challenge to the constitutionality of article 160. The
husband claimed a denial of equal protection because article 160 provides alimony only
to the wife. On original hearing, the majority considered the nature of public interest
in alimony, then concluded that there was no denial of equal protection. This conclusion was based on the reasoning that the husband had a right to alimony by proceeding
under article 21. On rehearing, the article was upheld, but there was a great division
among the members of the court. Three of the justices felt that providing alimony only
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cerned with alimony after divorce under article 160, declared
that the policy consideration underlying alimony is to prevent
divorced women from becoming wards of the state. 7 This same
public interest consideration was argued by the wife in
Holliday and, according to Justice Calogero's dissent, guided
the court in determining that alimony pendente lite is an inalienable right.48
Interest in preventing an individual from becoming a public burden is a valid state concern which is found in other areas
of the law. The Louisiana Civil Code forbids an individual from
divesting himself of all of his property by a donation inter
vivos.49 In addition, judicial approval of contracts not to compete has been limited, owing to a concern that an individual
will become a charge upon the community.Y' Both of these
situations demonstrate the underlying state concern that a person cannot by convention deprive himself of the ability to support himself. However, an antenuptial waiver of alimony by a
spouse does not present the same likelihood of ward-of-thestate status as is presented in the case of a donation of one's
entire patrimony or of a contract divesting oneself of the ability
to earn a living.
Waiver of alimony pendente lite does not take away an
individual's ability to support himself or herself. To assume
that a wife's waiver of alimony automatically occasions the
danger that she will become a ward of the state is to assume
that the only revenue which married women have is the salary
earned by their husbands. Such an assumption is unrealistic in
to the wife was not a denial of equal protection. An equal number of justices agreed
that there was no denial of equal protection, arguing that a husband could secure
alimony by relying on an exegesis of articles 21 and 160. The remaining justice agreed
with the husband that article 160 was unconstitutional. Id. at 314.
47. Id. at 308.
48. 358 So. 2d at 622 (Calogero, J., dissenting).
49. LA. Civ. CoInE art. 1497. Article 1497 states: "The donation inter vivos shall
in no case divest the donor of all his property; he must reserve to himself enough for
subsistence; if he does not do it, the donation is null for the whole." See also Kelly v.
Kelly, 131 La. 1024, 60 So. 671 (1913); Lagrange v. Barre, 11 Rob. 302, 20 La. 163
(1845); Comment, Donation Omnium Bonorum-Article 1497, 6 LA. L. REv. 98 (1944).
50. See Moorman & Givens v. Parkerson, 127 La. 835, 54 So. 47 (1911); National
Motor Club of La., Inc. v. Conque, 173 So. 2d 238 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965). See also
LA. R.S. 23:921 (1950 & Supp. 1962).
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light of modern social trends." In the case of waiver of alimony
pendente lite a spouse is not deprived of the ability to support
himself or herself as in the other areas considered above. Declaring the waiver of alimony pendente lite an absolute nullity
is not justified by a sufficiently strong public interest, since
there is no imminent danger that a spouse will become a public
charge.
In addition, as Justice Calogero notes,52 most waivers of
alimony pendente lite occur in marriage contracts in which the
spouses agree to remain separate in property. Such a provision
would seem to be most likely when both spouses had separate
property and therefore a potential source of revenue therein.
Furthermore, this means that a wife who waives alimony is in
no greater danger of being a social burden than she was during
the course of the marriage, when she was separate in property
from her husband. It is suggested, therefore, that public interest in the duty of support represented by alimony pendente lite
is not sufficiently strong to make its waiver a nullity. The probability that a spouse who waives alimony pendente lite will
become a public burden does not approach that of other situations where the danger of becoming a ward of the state is
deemed to outweigh the freedom to contract as one wishes. The
degree of public interest is further lessened by the fact that
most wives who waive alimony are separate in property from
their husbands and are no greater burdens than they are during
53
the marriage.
The question of the waivability of alimony has been raised
51.

In 1950, 21.6% of all married women with husbands present were in the labor

force. By 1976, this percentage had risen to 45.0%. U.S.

DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF

A DATABOOK 19, table 18 (1977). See also the
statistical information presented by Justice Dennis in Loyacano, 358 So. 2d at 307 n.7.
These statistics indicate that the possibility of ward-of-the-state status does not arise
LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. WORKING WOMEN:

automatically because a woman loses access to her husband's income. Nor would such
an assumption be valid for husbands if Louisiana were to adopt gender-neutral alimony laws.
52. 358 So. 2d at 622 (Calogero, J., dissenting).
53. An alternative view to the notion that the public has an interest in preventing
a spouse from becoming a ward of the state suggests that it is society's duty to provide
for its members and that welfare should not face competition from alimentary obligations between family members. See Sundberg, Marriage Or No Marriage-TheDirectives for the Revision of Swedish Family Law, 20 INT'L CoMP. L.Q. 223 (1971).
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in other jurisdictions and judicial reactions have varied. In a
number of states an antenuptial waiver of alimony has been
held void as against public policy for the same two reasons
raised in Holliday, foreseeability and public interest in the
duty of support.54 However, a recent trend has developed in
some jurisdictions to give effect to an antenuptial waiver of
alimony when freely entered into after full financial disclosure
by both spouses.55 These cases have been influenced by the type
of policy consideration expressed by the Connecticut Superior
Court in a recent decision: "While there is validity to the Madison Avenue pronouncement that 'you've come a long way,
baby,' it is equally true that the former complete protective
role of the court regarding alimony is no longer necessary in the
light of social changes.""0 It is suggested that this latter view
allowing waiver of alimony is the better view in light of the
limited possibility that a spouse will become a social burden
merely because he or she receives no alimony.
One issue closely related to those decided in Holliday, but
which was expressly reserved by the court,57 is the ability of a
wife to waive her right to alimony under article 160. The factors
which the court considered important to the waivability of alimony pendente lite also apply to alimony after divorce. 8 The
54. See, e.g., Belcher v. Belcher, 271 So. 2d 7 (Fla. 1972); Norris v. Norris, 174
N.W.2d 368 (Iowa 1970); McMains v. McMains, 15 N.Y.2d 283, 258 N.Y.S.2d 93, 206
N.E.2d 185 (1965); Motley v. Motley, 255 N.C. 190, 120 S.E.2d 422 (1961). One case,
decided by the Iowa Supreme Court, bears language which is markedly similar to that
of Holliday. The Iowa court stated: "The policy involved is that conditions which affect
alimony entitlement cannot accurately be foreseen at the time antenuptial agreements
are entered, and public interest in the enforcement of the legal obligation to support
overrides a premarital anticipatory forfeiture of alimony." In re Gudenkauf, 204
N.W.2d 586, 587 (Iowa 1973). For the similar language used by the Holiday court, see
note 23, supra.
55. See, e.g., Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1962); Buettner v.
Buettner, 89 Nev. 39, 505 P.2d 600 (1973); Hudson v. Hudson, 350 P.2d 596 (Okla.
1960); Unander v. Unander, 265 Or. 102, 506 P.2d 719 (1973).
56. Parniawski v. Parniawski, 359 A.2d 719, 721 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1976). The
court went on to hold that an antenuptial agreement in which the spouses agreed to
remain separate in property and waived any right to alimony was not contrary to
public policy and, therefore, enforceable against the wife. Id.
57. 358 So. 2d at 620 n.6.
58. The husband's duty of support under articles 119 and 120 is terminated by
the divorce judgment. However, there still remains the question of whether this waiver
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public interest in keeping the wife from becoming a social burden5" and lack of foreseeability apply as well to alimony after
divorce. If required to rule on an antenuptial contract waiving
alimony after divorce the court would likely declare the waiver
null on the same public interest grounds enunciated in
Holliday. It is urged, however, that the court should consider
the above discussion of the two Holliday factors. Foreseeability
is not a necessary requirement in other contractualagreements
and should not be required in antenuptial waivers of alimony.
Public interest in preventing the waiving spouse from becoming a public charge thus becomes the basis for considering such
a waiver. Because waiver of alimony presents a severely limited
likelihood that a spouse will become a ward of the state, this
public interest should not be considered a public policy unlawfully contravened by the antenuptial waiver of alimony after
divorce.
In the future, the legality of waivers of alimony, both pendente lite and after divorce, should be completely reconsidered
in light of the purpose of alimony and the applicable law. Two
considerations guided the court in Holliday, lack of foreseeability and public interest in enforcing the duty of support."' It has
been demonstrated that the requirement of foreseeability is not
applied in other contractual situations and that no special circumstances justify its imposition here. Therefore, the prime
consideration in examining the waivability of alimony becomes
the possibility that a spouse will become a ward of the state.
It is suggested that the minimal likelihood of this occurring in
this instance does not create a sufficient state interest to justify
holding the waiver of alimony a nullity. A comparison with
other situations where the possibility of ward-of-the-state .status controls supports this conclusion. The recent trend in other
jurisdictions whereby the waiver is honored when made by a
fully informed spouse represents the best solution in light of the
limited amount of public interest. If in future cases the court
of alimony would be contrary to good morals or public policy, and in violation of the
provisions of articles 11 and 2325.
59. See Loyacano v. Loyacano, 358 So. 2d 304 (La. 1978), vacated, 99 S. Ct. 1488
(1979).
60. 358 So. 2d at 620.
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is willing to disregard its questionable concern with foreseeability and concentrate upon the nature of the public interest in
alimony, Louisiana could join the states which have reached
this more desirable result.
Hervin A. Guidry

APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES:

A NEW

STANDARD IN LOUISIANA

The defendant, an eighteen-year-old male, had sexual intercourse with a consenting fifteen and one-half-year-old female and was convicted of carnal knowledge of a juvenile.' The
trial judge sentenced him to serve three years and six months
at hard labor. On the first appeal, the Louisiana Supreme
Court affirmed the conviction but remanded the case to the
trial court for resentencing because the judge had failed to
apply the sentencing guidelines of article 894.1 of the Louisiana
Code of Criminal Procedure.2 On the second appeal, after the
1. LA. R.S. 14:80 (1950 & Supp. 1977) provided in pertinent part: "Carnal
knowledge of a juvenile is committed when anyone over the age of seventeen has sexual
intercourse, with her consent; with any unmarried female person of the age of twelve
years or over, but under the age of seventeen years, where there is an age difference of
greater than two years between the two persons."
Although the defendant was actually convicted for a violation of the 1950 version
of Revised Statutes 14:80, the Louisiana Supreme Court in its analysis referred to the
1977 version of this statute. Act 539 of 1977 simply added the additional requirement
that there be a two-year age difference between the defendant and the victim. 1977
La. Acts, No. 539. Revised Statutes 14:80 was again amended in 1978 to afford equal
protection to male victims. 1978 La. Acts, No. 757.
2. LA. CODE CraM. P. art. 894.1 provides:
A. When a defendant has been convicted of a felony or misdemeanor, the
court should impose a sentence of imprisonment if:
(1) There is an undue risk that during the period of a suspended sentence
or probation the defendant will commit another crime;
(2) The defendant is in need of correctional treatment or a custodial environment that can be provided most effectively .by his commitment to an institution; or
(3) A lesser sentence will deprecate the seriousness of the defendant's
crime.
B. The following grounds, while not controlling the discretion of the court,
shall be accorded weight in its determination of suspension of sentence or probation:
(1) The defendant's criminal conduct neither caused nor threatened serious harm;

